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Abstract
Common-pool resources create a well known social
dilemma, and to solve the problem the recent literature in
economics has focused on how repeated interaction can promote
informal cooperation without the need for formal legal or political
institutions. This paper examines a particular example of a common
resource: common property in alpine communities of Northern
Italy between the 13th and the 19th century.  There, rather than
relying on repeated interaction alone, users created formal
mechanisms that regulated behavior and access to the common
property via quotas and time restrictions. Because the formal
institutions existed side by side with the sort of repeated interaction
that would bread informal cooperation, there was a paradoxical
redundancy of institutions.
On one hand, formal regulations were probably the best
way to limit the overuse of the commons. We consider the tradeoff
between developing formal regulations versus relying on informal
cooperation. Under certain conditions, the cost of building formal
institutions is repaid by a large gain in efficiency.
On the other hand, the users themselves had to create and administer
the formal institutions, and since the benefits of formal regulations
are a public good, each individual has an incentive to free ride. The
collective action problem of providing regulatory services was
surmounted thanks to the repeated interaction among users. The
paradox is thus resolved.
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1. INTRODUCTION*
In this paper we are concerned with the use of a common-pool resource, which constitute
an instance of social dilemma. Individual decisions to use the common resource lead to a sub-
optimal outcome that is often called tragedy of the commons (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). In this
situation economists have typically suggested two classes of solutions. One class is the intervention
of a political authority, such as in the case of the Enclosure Acts in Britain or regulatory authorities.
Another class of solutions relies on the results from the repeated game literature for the emergence
of spontaneous cooperation among the users. In this paper we investigate a third class of solutions,
self-governance, where a group of agents establishes a set of legal rules for their members and an
organization to implement those rules.
Empirically there are many instances of self-governance. Ostrom (1990) and Bromley
(1992) have reported of several instances of self-government of commons all around the world,
from farmers in the Andes, to fishermen in Turkey, to villages in Modern Age Japan. Netting
(1981) and Stevenson (1991) have carried on studies on Swiss peasants. Casari (1998) describes the
communal forest and grazing land of the Trentino region in the Italian Alps. In all these cases
there were formal regulations but no external authority chose the rules or was responsible for the
enforcement of those rules.
We investigate under which set of conditions would self-governance emerge as possible
solution to a social dilemma. We assume that the central state was too weak or too costly to call
into play. Several questions arise. Can repeated interaction among agents overrule short-term
temptations to free ride so that no regulations at all would be necessary? If not, can the group
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2modify the conditions in a way to support such informal cooperation? Can self-governance be a
better solution? What are the relations between the informal relationship of people in the group
and the formal aspects of institutions (Greif, 1998a)? What incentives do agents have to provide
the necessary institutions for self-governance?
We examine these questions looking at the centuries–old organization of the management
of common forests and pastures in the communities of the Trentino, in Northern Italy (Figure 1).
The commons were managed by the communities through self-governing institutions that were
coded in formal documents called Carte di Regola, or rural Charters. The rural Charters emerged in
the Principality of Trento as a legal innovation in the 13th century and thrived for about six
centuries. A Charter was a legal agreement among the members of the community, on one hand,
and between the community and the ruler, on the other, that allowed the community to establish
and enforce local economic regulations.1
<  Figure 1 about here  >
This paper presents a game theoretical and property rights examination of this pre-modern
institutional framework. While this contribution is about the management of communal resources
other studies have applied similar arguments to institutions facilitating private enforcement of
rules (Hay and Shleifer, 1998) and trade (Greif, 1998b, Clay, 1997, Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast,
1994). In particular, Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) explains how the merchant codes
governing medieval commercial transactions in Europe promoted the trust necessary for efficient
exchange when the individual traders had short-run temptations to cheat. Honest trade was
promoted through a system of private judges that kept a centralized record of the reputation of
individual merchants.
Similarly, Greif (1993) describes an institution that surmounted a commitment problem intrinsic
in the relations between Maghribis merchants operating in the Muslim Mediterranean area and
their oversee agents in 11th century trading contracts. The agency problem between merchants
and agents was overcome through the use of coalitions: they were groups of traders whose
member merchants were expected to hire only member agents and were cheating agents were
subjected to the punishment of all member merchants in the coalition.
As the authors point out, the key to understand those pre-modern trading institutions is
the theory of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Provided that a continuing relationship
3is established and that agents can monitor each other to some degree, informal cooperation can
emerge without state enforcement of contracts (Rubinstein, 1979; Green and Porter, 1984;
Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Kandori, 1992a; Fudenberg, Levin, and Maskin, 1994).
In general, cooperation is less than full, and more accurate monitoring results in a higher level of
cooperation (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1986, 1990; Kandori, 1992b). The focus of Milgrom,
North and Weingast (1990) is on such monitoring institution, which takes the form of a third
party – the judge -  that collects and verifies information and then shares it with anyone needing
it.  The traders have an incentive to be honest because suspected cheaters are punished though a
temporary ostracism from the community in the form of refusal to trade.
In contrast, Greif (1993) illustrates how the Maghribis merchants punished dishonest oversea
agents using informal mechanisms.
The present study applies the theory of repeated games with imperfect monitoring as well
and improves upon previous studies by taking up on three issues that have not yet been
extensively examined. First, we are dealing not with long-distance trade but with land use, where
the possibility of trespassing can undermine spontaneous cooperation. The problem with
trespassing is that if outsiders could easily enter the common resource, than they can reap the
benefits of villagers’ own cooperation efforts. The villages of Romeno, Don, and Amblar provide
a colorful reminder of the importance of this matter. The peasants of the three villages owned in
common a side valley mainly covered by forest. The valley was delimited on three sides by steep
mountains and in the only side where the access was feasible, the entrance was so narrow that
villagers built a gate on it and provided the gate with a lock. As the 1459 Charter states, the only
key was kept in the church of the village of Romeno. In this way the community governor could
have easily controlled everybody who went into the valley to log trees.2  In other, less fortunate
cases, the enforcement of property rights toward outsiders absorbed significant resources. The
rural Charters reduced substantially the transaction costs of enforcing property rights. 3
Secondly, because migration undermined the nature of the continuing relationship within
each village, institutions that promoted cooperation had to be robust to this additional threat. The
issue of the incentives to maintain a long-term relationship will be extensively analyzed because of
their crucial role in informal cooperation. Contrary to a common belief (Andreatta and Pace,
1981), the prohibition to trade communal land was not essential to ensure a long-term
relationship among villagers. The Trentino communities could, and sometimes did, sell the
commons. Instead, what guaranteed a long-term interaction was an elaborate form of village
4citizenship that discriminated between insiders and outsiders and granted selected rights to the
insiders. A key feature was the cost associated with the choice to leave the village.
The third issue concerning the situation of the Northern Italian communities is actually a
paradox. By establishing village citizenship rules, protecting property rights against outsiders, and
by gathering information on users’ actions, the communities created just the conditions needed to
sustain informal cooperation among the users of the commons Yet, instead of relying on informal
cooperation they used formal regulations, which is a surprising paradox. Interestingly, most of the
formal regulations concern the actions of insiders. Consider, for example, what happened in the
community of Mezzolombardo. On July 18, 1589 the governor (Giurato) of the village recorded that
a gentleman named Michel had been caught while illegally collecting firewood on common land. As
a result he had to pay a fine for like other neighboring communities, Mezzolombardo regulated
villagers’ use the community forests, pastures, and wastelands by restricting time and place of access
or imposing quantity restrictions.4 Mezzolombardo was hardly alone in enforcing these regulations
via fines. Indeed, hundreds of other communities in the Trentino region of the Italian Alps did the
same, as did villages throughout Europe. 5
The questions are then, on one side, why wasn’t informal cooperation sustainable or
effective? On the other side, as informal cooperation was not the way the resource was managed,
why was the community concerned about a long-term relationship among the users?
Here we define institutions as “non-technologically determined constraints that influence
social interaction and provide incentives to maintain regularities in behavior” (Greif, 1998). In
particular, formal institutions are defined as legal constraints that can be enforced in court. In contrast,
informal institutions are constraints that do not rely on a court of law neither for defining what
constitute improper behavior nor for administering punishment. An important example of this
kind is informal cooperation, that is the coordination on a strategy that supports an equilibrium yielding a
better outcome than the “tragedy of the commons” outcome in a repeated game.
The next section (Section two) applies the theory of repeated games to the situation of
villagers using a common a renewable resource, such as a forest or a pasture, and outlines the
conditions under which informal cooperation was possible and effective. Some of these
conditions are then analyzed in more depth. Section three examines the role of membership rules
in locking the villagers in a long-term relationship. Section four deals with formal sanctioning
institutions to stop trespassers and immigrants. Section five discusses the role of information-
gathering institutions to monitor individual actions. Section six suggests reasons why the
5Northern Italian communities adopted formal sanctioning institutions for insiders instead of
relying on informal cooperation while Section seven explains how the second order social
dilemma of building such formal institutions was solved. The conclusions discuss the broader
implications of the paper, setting forth the relative advantages and disadvantages of formal and
informal institutions.
2. WAS INFORMAL COOPERATION POSSIBLE?
One might think that the rural communities of Northern Italy offered the ideal situation
for observing the Folk theorem in action: the villages were small and isolated in a mountain area,
the villagers interacted with one another, and remained in the same village for generations. Upon
closer inspection, however, it becomes unclear whether the Folk theorem actually applies. In fact,
whether the Folk theorem operated turns out to depend on the presence of formal institutions
purposively created to make it work. This section presents the collective action problem through a
simple model, offers taxonomy of institutions, and then addresses some issues related to the
theory of repeated games. A comment about the efficiency of informal and formal institutions
follows.
A well-known body of the literature argues against unregulated common ownership of
resources  (Gordon, 1954; Clark, 1990). In the Trentino region a significant part of the land was
owned in common on a village basis. Forests covered almost half of the surface while grazing land
and meadows covered about one third of it and an overwhelming portion of both was owned in
common.6 For instance, in 1780 in a relatively large village (Levico) 95% of the forests was common
ownership and so was 66% of the meadows and pastures. The analogous shares in a high mountain
village (Predazzo) were 100% and 60%.7
The essence of the argument against common property is that it creates individual
incentives that lead to a sub-optimal outcome, or to a “tragedy” in Hardin’s words. The dilemma
can be captured by the following simple model that is set in a zero transaction cost world.
Consider a renewable resource of size L, such as a piece of forest, that yields revenues according
to a function Y=a·L·Q - b· Q2, where Q=Σi=1,..N  qi is the total quantity harvested by all the N
users and a, b, L are positive technological parameters. Each user i independently takes the
decision to harvest a quantity of timber qi≥0. Harvesting involves a cost linearly increasing in the
quantity appropriated, Ci=c·qi and so the user is left with a profit (rent) given by the difference
6between the revenues appropriated and the costs borne, iii cqYQ
q
−=π . The user’s revenues
depend in a non-linear fashion on the user’s appropriation level and on the appropriation of the
others in the group. At the group level profits are simply Π(L,Q)=Y-c·Q. This is a standard model
of a renewable resource first formalized by Gordon (1954). An exhaustive treatment can be also
found in Clark (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996).
The maximum profit that the group can extract from the common resource of size L,
Π*(L), is obtained when the group harvests the resource at an optimal level Q*, where the social
marginal cost, N·c, is equal to the social marginal benefit, a·L-2·b·Q*. When there is common
ownership and owners have unlimited rights to use the resource, the outcome will be less than
optimal. Group profits will be a fraction of the potential level, Π(L,Q)= E(Q) ·Π*(L), where E is
the efficiency function, 0≤E(Q)≤E(Q*)=1. In particular, there will be an overuse of the resource
at the symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) appropriation level compared to the optimal level,
QNE(N)>Q*, for any group size N bigger than one, and such overuse translates into a lower
efficiency, E(QNE(N))<1.8
A different arrangement is open access (OA), a situation where there are no property
rights to the resource and anybody can harvest it. In that case agents will access and use the
resource as long as there is a positive profit to make out of it. Formally, such open access
situation is studied computing the limit of the Nash equilibrium when the number of users goes
to infinity. The result is a severe overexploitation of the resource, QOA=2Q*, and a total
destruction of the potential profits that could be made out of the resource, EOA=0 and so
ΠOA(L)=0. Zero efficiency means that the revenues collected from the resource are just enough
to cover the harvesting costs. This situation is called severe tragedy of the commons in order to
distinguish it from the Nash equilibrium outcome that could results from an unregulated common
ownership. Figure 2 offers a simple illustration of the various levels of rent that two users could
extract from a resource.
<   Figure 2 about here  >
According to the model presented, the users of a common ownership resource in the absence of
regulations earns less than what they potentially could if the resource was properly managed (NE
7versus SO in Figure 2). This ‘tragedy’ is always better than an open access situation where the net
earnings of users are nil (NE versus OA).
When the interaction among the users of a commons is indefinitely repeated – as it was
among the villagers in Trentino – the outcome does not have to be a ‘tragedy’ (NE) but might
indeed be optimal (SO). This result has been proved under a variety of assumptions in the Folk
theorems, or as Myerson calls it, the General Feasibility Theorems: “The general feasibility
theorem can be interpreted as a statement about the power of social norms in small groups, such
as families, partnerships, and cliques. According to the general feasibility theorem, if the
individuals in a group know one another well, can observe one another’s behaviors, and anticipate
a continuing relationship with one another, then social norms can sustain any pattern of group
behavior, provided it makes each individual better off than he would be without the group. When
we go from small groups into larger social structures, however, the assumption that everyone can
observe everyone else may cease to hold, and general feasibility can fail” (Myerson, 1991, p. 349-
50). Such imperfect monitoring of individual actions turns out to have been a problem also for
the Northern Italian communities. Moreover, the interaction among the villagers was not
spontaneously repeated. Specific, formal institutions had to be established to bring the condition
closer to the one needed to sustain Folk theorem-type cooperation. To see why, let us first sketch
a general typology of formal and informal institutions. For our purposes, there are three types of
institutions:
1. Community-building institutions aim at defining the borderlines of the common land and to
identify a stable group of users (insiders) separated from the rest of the people (outsiders).
They are formal institutions that legally define property rights.
2. Information-gathering institutions refer to the processes of collecting information about
individual actions of insiders and outsiders and about the level of the physical stock of the
common resource, evaluating the reliability of the information, and sharing it with all
insiders.
3. Sanctioning institutions are the formal or informal ways chosen to punish a perceived free-
riding behavior of insiders and outsiders.
Each type of institution has a role in solving the collective action problem. The remaining
of this section focuses on the central role of some formal institutions in promoting informal
cooperation, beginning with community-building institutions. By informal cooperation we mean
8any improvement of the outcome above the ‘tragedy’ level (NE) that is achieved without formal
sanctioning of insiders. An agent is thus said to ‘cooperate’ when she reduces her use of the
common resource to a level below her one-stage best response level and her action improves the
group outcome.
Historically, the first step that villages took to use their commons more effectively was to
establish a legal title to the common land and a form of village citizenship. Those two formal
institutions transformed the legal status of forests and pastures from open access to close access.
They were enforced not through the expensive court system of the Prince, but through a
decentralized and self-administered system.
In fact, without a formal sanctioning institution to enforce property rights toward
outsiders – either Prince or village courts - informal cooperation among the villagers themselves is
doomed to fail because any effort to limit the over-use of the commons would be compensated
by an increased harvesting activity by outsiders. Consider for example a situation where there are
N users from the village itself (insiders) and M potential trespassers (outsiders). In the absence of
legal property rights and of a court system to punish trespassers, the number of users is in practice
N+M. Any cooperation agreement among insiders to limit resource use simply makes trespassing
more profitable for outsiders and so more frequent. More outsiders could decide to use the
common (increase in M)9. The only effective way to deter trespassing is through a system of legal
sanctions. Folk theorem type strategies would succeed only when users isolated from the outside
world but not when trespassing is easy, because outsiders can easily escape community
punishment. They might poach at the common and never show up again or they might free ride
temporarily on other communities until the original one has reverted to a cooperative mode.
In short, informal cooperation would be a failure without community-building institutions. In
particular, without having a well-defined group of users that have exclusive access to the resource,
the outcome would be a severe tragedy of the commons (OA in Figure 2).
Protection from outside free riding without repeated interaction among insiders would
ensure an improvement over the severe tragedy of the commons (namely a transition from OA to
NE) but not the optimal outcome (SO). The expectation of a continuous interaction was
guaranteed by a specific form of property rights on the common land that was in place to make it
costly for insiders to leave the community. A description of this important feature will be given in
the next section.
9Assume that proper community-building institutions were in place and there was an
expectation of continuous interaction. Under these conditions, informal cooperation was possible
provided that the agents were able to detect if the others cooperated: that way they could decide
whether to keep cooperating or to switch to punishing. An insider had two ways to assess the
cooperation level of the others, both of them imperfects.10 One way to detect cooperation levels
was to monitor the individual actions directed at resource use of all the other insiders. It turns
out, however, that such actions could be only partially observed. A second option was to look at
the physical stock of the resource and from it infer the aggregate cooperation level of all the other
agents.
By simply observing the physical stock of the common forest or pasture, a villager could
have inferred what others had harvested and thus whether they were cooperating. In other words,
instead of observing the people the villagers could have observed the land. The signal collected in
this way however was not necessarily precise; the peasants had a good idea of the physical stock
of the resource but did not know exactly how many trees were in the forest or the exact quantity
of grass on the ground compare to what was optimal11.  Such a noisy signal might be enough to
sustain some cooperation, although not full cooperation. We can see how much by applying the
Green-Porter model - which explains oligopolistic collusion with imperfect monitoring - to the
exploitation of a common renewable resource12 (Green and Porter, 1984 extended by Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1986, 1990). Given the information available, some level of informal
cooperation could have ensured a better outcome than the “tragedy of the commons” situation
but it would still be a sub-optimal one (GP, from Green-Porter, in Figure 2).
There are two types of costs associated with informal cooperation with imperfect
monitoring: one is due to the frequency with which the group reverts to punishment (α), which is
in general positive and generates a low payoff (Π’); the other cost derives from the inability in
general to support the socially optimal outcome during the cooperative periods (β<1).
ΠGP = (1-α) β Π* + α Π’ ,  0< α, β <1, Π*>Π’
The higher the noise level of the signal, the worse the outcome because of a higher chance of
punishment α and/or a lower best attainable cooperation level β.
A similar reasoning can be done when cooperation is assessed looking at individual use
levels of insiders. The information collected leads to an estimate of the cooperation level. Since
the information is less than perfect, the estimate is uncertain and informal cooperation will be
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able to support an outcome that is better than the ‘tragedy’ outcome (NE) but in general worse
than the socially optimal outcome (SO). The poorer the information and the more uncertain the
estimate will be, the worse the outcome will be. The adoption of formal information gathering
institutions could reduced the uncertainty and improve the outcome.
Instead of relying on informal cooperation among insiders, the Trentino communities
adopted formal regulations to manage the common forests and pastures. The two arrangements
relied on a very different sanctioning mechanism for insiders. Informal cooperation, we know,
relies on the threat of a punishment. The punishment is triggered by an aggregate use level that
exceeds an established threshold and it takes the form of a temporary overexploitation of the
common resource. All the insiders are involved in the punishment and this behavior is self-
enforcing in the sense that no external authority is needed to administer it. By contrast, formal
regulations use individual punishment of insiders. If somebody violates one of the rules governing
the villagers’ behavior, she is subjected to an individual punishment. Such a system is self-
governing in the sense that the insiders choose the rules and are responsible for their
enforcement.
The rural Charter system was thus an instance of self-governing regulations with formal
sanctioning institutions to punish insiders. A typical from the Charters might be an individual
quota and an associated monetary fine for violators of the quota.  Other rules temporarily
prohibited villagers from harvesting specific areas in the common forest and pasture. To enforce
those rules, the community appointed guards to patrol the land and officials to try alleged
violators. These formal institutions for information-gathering and sanctioning were costly to build
and maintain and those costs need to be subtracted when comparing the efficiency of different
arrangements.
This paper does not present empirical data to support the superiority of formal regulation
in the management of the commons over informal regulations. The comparison is between two
second-best outcomes, and the arrangement that can deliver a higher income stream to the
owners of the resource is likely to vary according to environmental conditions such as
informational conditions and enforcement technologies. The fact that both options, informal and
formal, were available and that the Northern Italian communities chose formal regulations
through the rural Charters induces to assume that the latter option was more efficient once
transaction costs were taken into account.
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To sum up, in a context of repeated interaction among insiders, the tragedy of the
commons might be avoidable if the Folk theorem applies. Two necessary conditions were first
formal sanctioning institutions to prevent free riding from outsiders and secondly a property
rights arrangement to promote long-term interaction among insiders. According to the theory of
repeated games, though, the best attainable outcome would have still been sub-optimal because
the cooperation level of insiders could be only imperfectly observed, either through the individual
actions of the agents or through the condition of the common resource. The Trentino villages did
not rely on informal cooperation among insiders but adopted a formal regulation system.
The following three sections cover in depth some crucial aspects of the rural Charter
system that have been just mentioned here, namely the role of membership rules in locking the
villagers in a long-term relationship and in controlling immigration, the formal sanctioning
institutions to stop trespassers, and the information-gathering institutions to monitor individual
actions.
3. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP
Without a long-term relationship among the legitimate users - the vicini – no informal
cooperation could be achieved. In fact, there was a continuing interaction among the vicini. It was
not, however, a ‘natural’ occurrence but the intended consequence of the type of chosen property
rights arrangements on the commons. This section illustrates the specific content of those
property rights in terms of freedom to leave the village, to sell and divide up the common land.
Emigration - the individual decision of an insider to leave the village - was possible but costly.
Selling or dividing the common land was possible only with the consent of a large majority of the
owners. These details were vital in ensuring a continuing interaction and therefore the
applicability of Folk theorems to this situation.
The peasants were not forced to live in the village. They used to migrate seasonally to the
nearby Veneto and Lombardia areas (Figure 1). In the beginning of the Nineteenth century, every
winter there was a flow of a few thousand workers going outside Trentino (Perini, 1852). This
temporary emigration activity had been going on for a long time (Grosselli, 1999).
Emigration could take place also toward other villages within the Trentino, granted that the
newcomers would be accepted. There were hundreds of separate communities and there is no
obvious reason to assume a long-term interaction within the same community.
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Despite this right to emigrate, few villagers decided to permanently leave the community.
The same family names can be found in the same small village and nowhere else literally for
centuries13. The fathers of the village owned and managed the commons and would transferred
them one day to their sons, then to their grandchildren, and so on. The interaction among the
vicini was a long-term one and the likelihood that the interaction took place the following year was
so high that we are as close as we can get in a real world setting to the theoretical assumptions of
infinite repetition.
Why did villagers not leave the original community? Because there was an individual right
to exit the community but exercising such right was costly. The crucial point is that anybody had
the political freedom to leave the village, but no claim could be made of the community common
resources. He could sell his individually owned house and fields but not his share in the
community land. According to current property laws, if three persons own a piece of land in
common and one of them wants to get out of the estate for no reason, she has the right either to
sell her part to anybody or to be refunded by the other two. The arrangement in the North Italian
villages was rather different. No Charter ever mentions the right of a vicino to be refunded of the
value of his share of common land in case he leaves the community, let alone the procedures to
satisfy that right. Moreover, there was a prohibition on trading his right to membership. On the
contrary, there are indications that additional punishments were added to the decision to leave.
To begin with, if a community member no longer lived in the village (non ha fuoco), he could not
use any more the common resources. In addition, if he returned to the village, he had to perform
his chores (obblighi or fattioni) upon his return to the community, but sometimes could not use the
common forest and pasture for one additional year 14.
In practical terms, the villagers were locked into a long-term relationship one with another
because the individual decision to leave the community in which a peasant was born involved
losing the right to use the common land, at least while not presently living there, possibly for
longer than that, and sometimes forever. Other features of the property right arrangement further
support the view that it was an explicit intention of the community to set up a lock in mechanism.
The common land could be collectively sold and divided up among insiders. For instance,
the villages of Nago and Torbole sold part of their common forest to an outsider and divided up
another portion of their forest into individual assignments15.  Tradability of the land was not an
issue; the real concern was how that was done. The rights of alienation and division were
specifically design in a way to safeguard the lock-in mechanism that we have just described.
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Every detail in the property rights arrangement on the common land is aimed at promoting a
long-term relationship.
As mentioned, parcels of the common forest and pasture were sometimes assigned to the
members of the community in exclusive individual use. Such assignments were internal
arrangements and the external legal property rights on the land always belonged to the
community. In fact, when a member left the village, he also had to return his individual
assignment to the community because it constituted a proper portion of the common resource. In
addition, whenever the single villager could transfer his rights on the assignment, the buyer had to
be a member of the community. 16
What could have been a threat to informal cooperation was an individual right to sell a
share of common land to others. A vicino did not have this right. Otherwise, he could have taken
advantage of the common resource by generously appropriating timber and overgraze the
common pastures and then alienate his property right before the others would punish him using a
Tit-for-tat strategy. That is why the right to sell the common land was always a collective right
that belonged to the community as a whole. The rural Charters required the consent of a wide
majority of the vicini for the alienation decision17.
In conclusion, the property rights arrangement on the common land promoted a long-
term interaction among the vicini, because the option to exit the community was costly. The
individual vicino had the right to use the common resources according to the community rules and
the right to participate in shaping those rules but no right to secession with compensation. Under
these conditions, free riding was not profitable because avoiding the cost of the punishment
involved facing the greater cost of leaving the community. Hence, the best behavior was not to
exit the community but to cooperate and eventually voice complaints during the community
gatherings (Hirshman, 1972).
4. PROTECTING THE COMMUNITY FROM OUTSIDERS
Without restrictions to immigration and trespassing, the community land would be in
practice available to everyone. As this section explains, the commons in Northern Italy were
common ownership and not open access resources. First, there was a form of village citizenship
or membership to govern the access to the commons by immigrants.  The pillar of such system
was the distinction between the group of legitimate users and regulators of the commons, called
14
the vicini (“neighbors”, insiders) and all the others, called the forestieri (“strangers”, outsiders).18
The second element that safeguarded the common ownership was a system of decentralized
enforcement of property rights toward illegal trespassing. The rural Charters provided the legal
tool for the delegation of jurisdictional powers from the Prince courts to village officers.
Although it did not resulted in a perfect enforcement of property rights, this institutional
innovation decreased transactions cost of common ownership. We will begin with an analysis of
the membership system.
The most rewarding free-riding action was probably to settle down in a village with a high
per capita endowment of common resources and acquire full rights to use the commons. We
might expect the members of the “poorest” communities to attempt moving into the “richest”
communities. For persons without any memberships, acquiring any village membership would
make them better off since they could access the commons for free. There were basically two
tricks to acquire membership, through marriage with a vicino and through living long enough in a
village.19 Both the tricks and the correspondent countermeasures will be described.
The membership right entitled all the family members of the vicino to use the common
resource and the vicino himself to participate and vote in the village assemblies that decided on
various matters. The right was transmitted from father to son, but usually the son of a vicino would
be recognized as a separate member only when moving out of his father’s household with his
wife. Since the membership right was usually inherited through a male lineage in all the villages,
the wives would move to the husband’s community and the system would be in balance.20 There
was however a legal loophole in the system and specifically in the remote valley of Fiemme. Up to
1582, in the Fiemme Valley the right to be a vicino was inherited by both sons and daughters of a
vicino. Since the endowment of common forests and pastures was definitely richer in Fiemme than
in many other communities, men from other villages tried to marry women from the Fiemme
Valley. The practice became so widespread that the assembly of the vicini of Fiemme decided at
one point to restrict the inheritance of commons' rights to sons only, as it generally was in most
of the other Trentino communities. In a letter to the Prince dated 16 November 1583, the
community governor actually complained about the “mess and losses” caused by immigrants and
argued in favor of a reform. 21
Another possible way to gain access to the commons was to simply become a resident of
the village and slowly work the way into a de facto user status. The vicini were more than alerted
to those kinds of guys and usually dictated the following list of conditions for admission. First, the
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community needed to give explicit approval before an outsider could use the commons, or even
before settling down in the village. Secondly, the newcomer had to pay an annual fee. Thirdly, the
right could not be transmitted to descendants.
The vicini wanted first of all to screen out people not worthy of trust (degni di fede) and
would sometimes ask prospective residents, as in the Charter of Cles for convincing proofs of an
honest life and of decency.22 In the Charters where the procedure is mentioned, the consensus of
the vicini needed to be nearly unanimous.23
Admitting additional users on the common resource meant giving away a share of the
claims on the resource profits, which is equivalent to alienate a portion of the property rights.
The existing users wanted not only to have a say about the admission decision but also to be
compensated for the reduction in their share of resources. In corporate law, this right is analogous
to the right of shareholders to deliberate about the emission of new preferred shares and decide
about their price. Interestingly enough, in 1671 the community assembly of the village of Cis
stated - in the very same article of their Charter - that admitting a new member had to be
deliberated with the same majority as the one adopted for selling the common land (any group of
three or more vicini could veto the decision).24 The annual fee was usually assessed on a case-by-
case basis and in proportion to the expected use of the forest and pasture, looking at the size of
the family or the number of animals owned.25
The acquired right to use the common land was tied to the designated person. It could not
be sold or automatically passed on to descendants. Moreover, most of the times the new user could
not participate or vote in the village assemblies and was considered an “outsider resident” but still
forestiero.
Since sneaking into the community as a would-be new member hardly went unnoticed,
outside free riders could only trespass.  Such action was unanimously prohibited in the rural
Charters (see Table 1).  Outlawing trespassing, though, was not enough to eliminate it.
One might think that villagers could call in state courts to stop trespassing. But using the
state court system to protect the property rights was often impractical because of the high costs
involved. At the same time, enforcing the legal property rights on the common forests and pastures
was essential to achieve an efficient management. The rural Charters emerged in the 13th century as
a legal innovation to reduce the transaction costs involved in enforcing property rights on the land.26
The rural Charters (Carte di Regola) were formal documents drawn up by a notary in front of the
village assembly and then sent to the Prince of Trento for official approval. An approved Charter
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awarded the villagers with the authority to enforce the rules listed in the Charter and in particular
with the powers to appoint guards (saltari) and inflict monetary sanctions to trespassers.
But even though the Charters created a more efficient, decentralized enforcement of the
property rights, not all trespassers were discouraged by the threat of a fine.27 The enforcement of
property rights was in fact likely to be incomplete because of the monitoring costs and the costs of
collecting the fine. Detecting a trespasser, bringing her to court, and cashing the fine were time-
consuming. If either the potential damage was small or the action was too difficult to detect then the
community would not profit by engaging in a stricter enforcement of property rights. For instance,
detecting trespassing during the night requires a higher effort. In order to discourage it, the
community usually doubled the penalty. Instead increasing the probability of catching the person p,
the expected gain from trespassing can be lowered by raising the amount of the fine s.  A formal
model of the decision is sketched in the appendix.
The punishment level, however, was constrained by both economical and legal upper
bounds. Under some conditions, there is a level of nominal amount of the fine that could ensure in
theory a complete enforcement because the expected punishment p⋅s can be raised above the actual
benefit of trespassing. 28  In practice, there was a ceiling to the maximum fine that could be imposed
because of two constraints. The economic constraint comes from the fact that most peasants were
poor and did not own much that could be taken away in order to pay the fine. Setting a fine higher
than the value of their belongings did not necessarily increase the threat of the punishment. Besides
these economic considerations, the rural communities in Trentino could not legally establish fines
above a maximum amount set by the central political authority.  A 1586 ordinance of the Prince of
Trento called the Moderatio Betta set a limit of 5 ragnesi for any fine stated in the rural Charters. The
Prince granted some self-governance powers to the local communities but did not want them to
substitute the ordinary courts and laws on more relevant issues. Physical punishments, for instance,
were  not allowed because criminal law was the exclusive realm of feudal authorities. The rule was
binding on the communities as it is evident by the many attempts to include higher fines and from
the subsequent censoring from the Prince beureaucrats when approving the Charters.29
In conclusion, there were membership rules and a deterrence mechanism for trespassing that
effectively restricted the access to the community land to a well-defined group of users. The
enforcement against trespassers was imperfect and – as it will be discussed later on - this made the
signal about insiders’ cooperation level more uncertain. Moreover, the rural Charters were
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convenient legal tools to lower the transaction costs of fighting trespassing but they might have been
- and actually were - employed also for other tasks.
5. MONITORING INSIDERS
Although less difficult to monitor than outsiders’ actions, insiders’ usage levels of the
common resource were not fully known by the other insiders. As already discussed, imperfect
monitoring of insiders might undermine informal cooperation. Once property rights on the
common resources are legally well-defined and enforced and once insiders face a continuing
relationship, informal cooperation can be sustained provided that each insider can assess the
cooperation level of the others, so that she could decide whether to keep cooperating or to switch
to punishing. This section discusses one way to detect free riding, simply by observing the actions
of appropriation of the common resource of all the other insiders.
Several cues suggest that monitoring individual actions of insiders was problematic.
Consider, for instance, the common prohibition of harvesting grapes in individually owned
vineyards before a date designated by the village assembly (Table 1). This apparently odd rule is
quite sensible when monitoring is imperfect or costly. If all peasants were in the vineyards to
harvest the same day, they could have checked one another’s behavior at no additional cost.
Without this regulation, instead, it would have been easy for a peasant to pick the grapes of his
neighbors without being noticed. 30 In addition, during the weeks before harvesting day, the
community paid a guard to police the vineyards all day long - and sometimes all night, too. The
existence of guards indicates that monitoring was costly but necessary. 31
More generally, there was a widespread fear of thefts from the fields. There were frequent
complaints of robberies of fruits and vegetable. In order to reduce this risk, the peasants adopted
inefficient agricultural practices, such as tiny vegetable gardens located nearby houses and shrunk
areas devoted to orchards (Monteleone, 1964).32 Sanctions for thieves were doubled when
monitoring was particularly difficult such as at night or if the thief was an outsider (Table 1).33
A further example of imperfect monitoring was the prohibition to stay overnight or during
religious holidays in the high mountain meadows and forests. The 1586 Charter of Sanzeno
explains that the aim of the rule was to avoid free riding on the common resource or thefts in
individual plots. Given that everybody else was in the village or observing the no-work custom,
the free rider would have been difficult to catch.34
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In conclusion, individual appropriation actions of insiders were not public information.
On the contrary their knowledge required in general costly monitoring activities. The examples
given above show however how appropriate information-gathering institutions could bring a
community closer to an ideal situation of perfect monitoring.
In order to gather additional information about insiders’ behavior, the Charters adopted
three kinds of methods: a direct one - through guards hired to patrol the land - and two indirect
ones – through an imposed re-organization of production to make actions more readily
observable and through a monetary incentive for whoever would discover the violation of a rule.
All three ways involved costs for the community, which is evidence that a positive benefit was
expected from it.
Some guards were hired to patrol the high mountain pastures and forests (saltari del monte) while
others were in charge of patrolling the meadows nearby the village (saltari di campagna).35 The
saltaro received a share, usually one third, of the fine collected by anybody that he caught breaking
one of the Charter’s regulations. If an ordinary vicino reported a violation to the governor’s
officials and the report was recognized to be grounded, he - instead of the saltaro - would receive a
share of the cashed fine.
Gathering information about insiders was costly but the same guards could be employed to report
both trespassing and insiders’ behavior. The economies of scope of the two activities were likely
to be very high. Moreover, for reasons similar to the ones put forward for trespassing in the
previous section, it was unlikely that knowledge about insiders’ actions would be perfect. The
interested reader can look at the model in the appendix.
We should still keep in mind that a lot of information about others’ actions was acquired
as a byproduct of daily activities of the villagers and was coming without a cost, especially because
of the small size of villages. The population of most villages was in the order of few hundred
people. In the village of Don just twelve heads of families gathered in 1493 to draw a new
Charter.36
Besides gathering information, two important roles of monitoring institutions were to
validate knowledge and to disseminate it among all insiders. Uncontrolled rumors of a free riding
action that quickly spread among insiders could trigger a collective punishment, even if the claim
is wrong. To avoid such an inefficient outcome, it would pay to follow an established procedure
and investigate alleged violations in order to come up with corroborated and unbiased
conclusions. Efficiency might also suffer if insiders receive private signals about the actual level of
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cooperation of the other insiders. Suppose, for instance, that just one user believes that a violation
occurred and switches to a punishing mode. The following period the increase in use could trigger
everybody else’s to punishing. A perturbation of any of the private signals could provoke a
cascade that drags the whole group to the punishment mode. Here appropriate institutions could
help to promote coordination among agents in the choice between cooperation and punishment
(Kandori and Matsushima, 1998; Compte, 1998; see note 9).
Village courts and periodic meetings of the vicini did precisely this: they helped to
accomplish both goals of validating and disseminating information about free riding actions. A
village court would hear witnesses, read the Charter, and come up with an ‘official truth’ about
the alleged violation. The court would also eventually inflict a monetary fine to the insider, since
there were formal sanctioning institutions for insiders. In principle, however, the two functions of
validating knowledge and punishing the agent are distinct and the former one is relevant also for
informal cooperation. There are in fact parallels elsewhere in the world. For example, in some
Bolivian communities that rely on informal sanctioning institutions, the leader of the village
publicly announces when somebody has violated a norm governing the use of the common
resource. The announcement thus works as a coordination device to trigger the punishment by all
the villagers.37
<   Table 1 about here  >
To sum up, monitoring of insiders’ actions was imperfect but proper institutions could
improve the efficiency of informal cooperation through the gathering, validation, and sharing of
information. Moreover, there were economies of scope between institutions to monitor insiders
and to detect illegal trespassers. Having information about individual actions’ of all insiders is one
way to assess the cooperation level of insiders but there is the alternative to look at the level of
physical stock of the resource. Nevertheless, it has the advantage of enabling the community to
inflict individual punishments, either using social sanctions or formal sanctioning institutions.
6. INSTITUTIONS TO SANCTION INSIDERS
Up to this point, we have established the need of community-building institutions and
formal sanctioning for outsiders in order to apply the Folk theorem and mentioned the possibility
to employ information-gathering institutions to improve the outcome. This section goes one step
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further by comparing the advantages and disadvantages of formal over informal sanctioning
institutions in charge of punishing free-riding behavior of insiders. The Northern Italian
communities adopted formal sanctioning institutions for insiders.
When monitoring is imperfect, informal cooperation involves sizable losses for the
insiders. The reason is that informal sanctions in the form of a temporary overuse of the common
resource by all the insiders inflict a cost on both free riders and cooperators, a cost that is a
deadweight loss for the group. Under perfect information conditions, a self-interested agent never
free rides in equilibrium because she knows that the group will surely revert to a punishment
mode and the individual cost from the punishment outweighs the benefit of free-riding. But with
imperfect monitoring the group is not able to assess with certainty if somebody free rode. For
instance a signal of bad condition of the resource could be the result of insufficient cooperation
or of some external shock, such as unfavorable weather conditions. There were at least two
sources of uncertainty on the signal S about the condition of the common forests and pastures:
first, an imperfect survey of the current condition of the resource; second, because of chances of
thefts from outsiders. Since the enforcement of property rights toward outsiders was not absolute,
the theft of an outsider could have been mistakenly interpreted as free riding behavior of an
insider and triggered a punishment. In other words, the undetected appropriation by outsiders
was an additional and independent source of bias because the same stock of resource could have
been the results of various combinations of insider and outsider appropriation levels.
The optimal strategy with imperfect monitoring is to tolerate some degree of apparent
overuse of the common resource but revert to a punishment mode whenever the signal is below a
given threshold. The implication is that in equilibrium there are recurrent, costly collective
punishments of insiders and when there is no punishment the outcome is still less than optimal.
The mechanism is very different with formal sanctioning institutions. Formal sanctions are fines
that an official of the community forces the free rider to pay, although most of the time the
payment is voluntary. The circumstances under which the punishment was inflicted were specified
in the rural Charters and so were the amounts of the fines.
The main advantage of formal over informal sanctions was that the formers were mostly a
transfer of resources within the community and not a deadweight loss. In the Trentino
communities, revenues from fines were divided between the officers, the person who brought the
violator in front of the court, and the community treasury. Sometimes a share of the fine - usually
one third but sometimes half - was paid to the Prince or to the local feudal lord. In the sample of
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Charters surveyed in Table 1, a payment was required from 35% of the communities. This
transfer from the community to the Prince was not a cost but rather a rent. Since formal
regulations were successful compared to the alternative of informal cooperation and since the
Prince had the power to approve or revoke a Charter, he claimed part of the surplus for himself.38
The only real variable cost of inflicting a fine came from assessing the violation and
eventually having to force the payment, so that a fraction ϑ of the revenue R was wasted in the
process of cashing it. This cost includes the resources employed to monitor the individual actions
of insiders. While informal cooperation can rely on aggregate knowledge of resource use, formal
sanctioning needs information about individual actions. This last point brings us to the second
advantage of formal sanctions, namely the punishment is directed toward the free rider only and
not to the whole group. A mistake in detecting a violation is therefore less costly with formal
sanctioning institutions.
On the other hand, the main disadvantage of formal sanctions was the sunk cost of
creating and maintaining additional formal institutions. The vicini had to agree upon a set of
regulations and to finance the monitoring activity and the court system. Writing an official
document such as a rural Charter involved non-recoverable costs and so was spending time in the
community meetings to listen and vote on an endless list of small issues. There were however
strong complementarities between these activities and the institution-building necessary for the
enforcement of property rights toward outsiders. Both required appointing guards to monitor
individual actions and once a guard was patrolling the forest looking for outsiders, it took little
extra effort to report the actions of insiders as well. Prosecuting outsiders required courts and
officials in charge of cashing the fine. The same machinery could be used for insiders.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the extra monitoring efforts and the creation of formal
regulations for insiders were a cost for the community.
From the fact that the Trentino communities chose formal sanctioning institutions for
insiders while informal sanctioning was available, I conclude that the former was probably more
efficient in the sense that the formal sanctioning payoff was greater than the informal sanctioning
payoff:
Π*- C - ϑR – TC    >    (1-α) β Π* + α Π’ – TC, 0< α, β <1, Π*>Π’
Here TC are the transaction costs common to formal and informal sanctioning, C is the additional
sunk cost of formal regulations of insiders, and Π* is the maximum group profits in an ideal zero
transaction cost world.
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The greater efficiency of formal sanctioning institutions is not a general conclusion but
depends upon informational and technological conditions.  For instance, the efficiency of
informal cooperation depends from the quality of the signal about the condition of the resource.
The more erratic was the pattern of trespassing by outsiders and the worse was the signal. A
formal regulation of insiders was likely to be more efficient for villages nearby a main road or in a
heavily inhabited valley then in isolated villages. Another central variable was the wage level.
Institution-building is a labor-intensive activity, so the lower the salary relative to the value of
timber or milk and the more likely is that a community would choose formal sanctioning for
insiders.
An informal sanctioning alternative to the collective overuse of the resource could be used
to support cooperation, namely social sanctions. A social sanction occurs when an agent
voluntarily performs a costly act in order to punish somebody who has violated a norm of the
society. The strategies employed in a Folk theorem usually consider punishments taking place in
the same realm of the resource use in the form of a temporary or permanent non-cooperative
mode. People living in the same village however were involved in several other interactions
besides the use of the common resource. Free-riding behavior on the common resource could
have been punished with a denial of credit, with the refusal to rent a privately owned field, or the
rejection of a marriage proposal. An advantage of social sanction is that the punishment was
targeted to the individual free rider. On the other hand, inflicting individual punishments requires
knowledge of individual actions and hence monitoring was still necessary to avoid a high rate of
‘undeserved’ punishments. Unless legal regulations, there was no need to build costly institutions.
Despite the advantages, the community adopted formal sanctions where community
officials were in charge of punishing the individual defector through a monetary fine. A social
sanction, in fact, entails a loss for both the agent who inflicts it as well as for the targeted agent.
At the societal level social sanctions bring destruction of resources. As have already been
mentioned, a legal sanction instead is often voluntarily paid (under the threat of violence by
higher authorities) and is mostly a transfer of resources within the community. Its aim is to be
costly for the targeted agent, but at the community level there is no destruction of resources
besides collecting costs.39
To sum up, formal sanctioning institutions exhibit advantages and disadvantages in
comparison with informal sanctioning institutions. The advantages are that the punishment is not
a deadweight loss for the group and is directed only toward the free rider instead of the whole
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group. The disadvantages of formal regulations include the need to build additional formal
institutions to prosecute insiders and to monitor individual actions of insiders. Social sanctions
have been briefly discussed. In the specific conditions of the Northern Italian communities formal
sanctioning institutions for insiders were chosen probably because they were more efficient than
informal cooperation. Still, we need to explain how those institutions came to place.
7. SECOND ORDER SOCIAL DILEMMA: WHO BUILDS THE INSTITUTIONS?
We know for a fact that the Trentino communities – instead of relying on informal
cooperation among their members - adopted formal sanctioning institutions for insiders. If they
made this choice because it was more efficient, we still have to explain how those institutions
were established.  The point in question is that formal institutions are similar in nature to public
goods, they supply valuable services to the whole group but they are costly to provide and each
member of the group has too little incentives to contribute to them. As a result, a beneficial
institution might never be created. A possible way around it is the one chosen by the Trentino
communities.
Compliance with the regulations benefited everybody because it promoted efficient use of
the common resource. Regulations were enacted through a formal sanctioning system toward
insiders. In the Northern Italian villages, the community officials exacted a monetary payment
when an insider appropriated timber or grazed on the commons in violation of a Charter rule.
Inducing compliance with the regulations, on the other hand, constituted another social dilemma.
Crafting, updating, and enforcing formal regulations involved costly activities and it was not in
the best self-interest of any individual to voluntary bear those costs. In other words, regulations
solved the social dilemma of the use of a common resource but generated a second-order social
dilemma of institution building.
Before discussing how the new dilemma was solved, we have to consider the costs
associated with formal regulations of insiders. There were at least three types of costs: first,
appropriated usage rules and prosecution procedures had to be negotiated in meetings among
villagers, recorded by a notary, and then submitted to the political authority for approval.
Participation at the community meetings was time consuming and the discussions frequently
raised animosities.40 Some villagers would have preferred to avoid them. Second, once the legal
rules and procedures were agreed upon, additional efforts needed to be devoted to information-
gathering activities in order to monitor the individual actions of insiders. That could have taken
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the form of additional guards, constraints on actions – such as a no going out at night in the
woods rule -, and additional monitoring efforts by ordinary vicini. Third, enforcing regulations
entailed other significant costs. A transgressor sometimes had to be brought in front of the
governor and an estimation of the damage that was done to the resource assessed. Sometimes
dedicated officials (stimadori) were in charge of suggesting a fair compensation to be paid on top
of the penalty indicated in the Charter. The convicted transgressor could then appeal to the
community assembly and after that to the Prince courts. These activities of determining the
amount of punishment and actually exacting the payment were costly. For instance, the office of
governor (regolano) was oftentimes taken on unwillingly by a vicino because it was more of a burden
than a form of employment. The option of relinquishing the office after being elected was
frequently considered unacceptable. To avoid an uneven distribution of efforts among the
insiders, some communities rotated the office among all the vicini while others set limits to the
number of consecutive terms in office. 41
To sum up, formal regulations were costly to provide but the vicini did not have the
individual incentive to voluntary provide efforts to build and run them. As mentioned, there is
evidence in least two instances - participation in assemblies and acceptance of some offices - that
the vicini were quite reluctant to contribute to the village institutions.
This second order social dilemma of providing formal institutions was surmounted
through informal cooperation. According to the theory of repeated games, provided that some
conditions are met, an optimal level of contributions to the creation of formal institutions could
be sustained. In this case there was no difficulty in observing individual actions because
everybody knew who was participating to meetings, involved in court actions, or holding offices.
Eventual free riding could have been punished with social sanctions or other means. The
community of Romallo provides an example: it explicitly used ostracism. A vicino that refused to
perform the required tasks was deprived of his status of insider and considered an outsider. As
such he would have to pay rent for using the communal resources.42
The role of informal cooperation here helps to resolve the paradox that we began with:
namely, that although the Trentino communities met the conditions needed for informal
cooperation, they apparently turned to formal regulations to manage the commons. The paradox
was only apparent. The seemingly redundant institutions, in fact, served different purposes. The
formal regulations aimed at limiting the appropriation of resources from the common forests and
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pastures, while the informal cooperation supported the provision of such effective formal
institutions. The paradox is thus resolved.
In a sense, both the informal and especially formal institutions can be thought as social
capital (Coleman, 1990, chapter 12). They were part of a set of valuable assets in the form of
community organizations, social networks, customary coordination cues that were useful for the
efficient conduct of economic activities. Such social capital is subjected to depletion and needs
constant replenishment in order to allow the same level of efficiency. A portion of this capital was
inherited from previous generations. A member of the community benefited not only for the
availability of a physical capital in the form of communal forests and pastures but also from the
social capital that protected the property rights and made possible the efficient use of the
resources. It might well be that in a context where the central state was weak the former without
the latter was worthless. 43
In conclusion, the contributions to institution building activities from insiders were
provided thanks to the repeated nature of the interaction among insiders. The Folk theorem
helped here but it did not directly solve the social dilemma of limiting the use of the communal
resources. Rather, its role was only indirect in that it supported the creation and maintenance of
the formal institutions, which prevented the ‘tragedy of the commons’.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper discusses the interrelations between formal and informal institutions in solving
a well-known social dilemma, the management of a common property resource. The issue is
examined in reference to the alpine communities of the Trentino, a region of Northern Italy.
Formal institutions existed side by side with the sort of repeated interaction that would bread
informal cooperation generating a paradoxical redundancy of institutions.
The contribution of the paper is a game theoretical and property rights examination of the
emergence of this pre-modern institutional framework. Other studies have highlighted the
complementarities between formal and informal institutions to facilitate private enforcement of
rules (Hay and Shleifer, 1998) and trade (Greif, 1998b; Clay, 1997; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast,
1994; Greif, 1993; Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990). Here the focus is the relative advantages
and disadvantages of one over the other and on the conditions that make self-governance
possible.
26
One might think that the rural communities of Northern Italy in the period from the 13th
to the 19th century offered the ideal situation for observing the Folk theorem in action: the
villages were small and isolated in a mountain area, the villagers interacted with one another, and
remained in the same village for generations. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes unclear
whether the Folk theorem actually applies. In fact, whether the standard Folk theorem operated
turns out to depend on the presence of formal institutions purposively created to make it work.
Property rights were aimed at excluding outsiders from the use of the commons and promoting a
long-term interaction among the users (Rubinstein, 1979; Green and Porter, 1984; Fudenberg and
Maskin, 1986; Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1986, 1990; Kandori, 1992a, 1992b; Fudenberg, Levin,
and Maskin, 1994). The two goals were achieved by prosecuting trespassing (Section 4) and by an
elaborate set of membership rules (Sections 3 and 4). In particular, as leaving the community
meant renouncing the benefits of the common resource, villagers had an incentive to stay.
Despite having created the conditions to support informal cooperation, the rural
communities adopted formal institutions to manage the commons, where users that exceeded the
individual quotas or violated the time or place restrictions were subjected to a monetary fine.
Here the formal institutions were legal constraints to behavior that could be enforced in court.
The rural Charters established self-governing formal institutions, which means that the insiders
chose themselves the set of rules and were responsible of the enforcement of those rules.
Limiting the overuse of the common forests and pastures with formal institutions and not
with informal cooperation was probably more efficient. Both alternatives were available and the
communities relied on the former one. This paper however does not present empirical data to
support the superiority of formal regulation in the management of the commons over informal
regulations. Moreover, I expect the arrangement that can deliver a higher income stream to the
owners of the resource to vary according to conditions such as wage level and distance from
roads. The test of this prediction is left for future research. There are tradeoffs between
developing formal regulations versus relying on informal cooperation.
Formal regulations have the advantage of a more efficient sanctioning system but require
the development of additional formal institutions that are costly to create and maintain (Section
6). With informal cooperation, there were significant deadweight losses due to the recurrent
collective punishment of the users because of imperfect monitoring. In order to sustain
cooperation, the users must know the cooperation level of the others, so that they could decide
whether to keep cooperating or to switch to punishing. As the users had only a noisy signal about
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the cooperation level, there would be periodic overuse of the resource that would harm both free
riders and cooperators. A formal sanctioning system, instead, targets only the free riders and the
punishment is mostly a transfer of resources within the community and not a deadweight loss.
Exacting monetary fines involved some effort but most of the money would flow to either the
community officials or treasure.
On the other hand, creating and maintaining additional formal institutions was costly. The
users had to agree upon a set of regulations, engage in extra monitoring activity, and run the court
system. Those activities absorbed real resources and such costs should be taken into account
when comparing efficiencies of different arrangements. The rural Charters constituted a legal
innovation that decreased transaction costs of defining property rights and enacting formal
regulations. They allowed a decentralization of jurisdictional powers from the expensive state
courts to village officers. Under certain conditions, the cost of building formal institutions was
less than the gain in efficiency associated with it.
The choice of formal regulations for the management of the commons raises two related
questions. On one side, stating their superiority in terms of efficiency does not explain how
formal institutions were established. Since the formal regulations were self-governing the users
themselves had to bear the costs of creating and maintaining them. Formal institutions are similar
in nature to public goods, as they supply valuable services to the whole group but they are costly
to provide and each member of the group has too little incentives to contribute to them. As a
result, a beneficial institution might never be created. On the other side, there is the paradox of
redundancy because formal institutions existed side by side with the sort of repeated interaction
that would support informal cooperation.
 The paradox is resolved considering the two layers of social dilemmas. There was a first-
order social dilemma concerning the efficient use of the commons. This dilemma was surmounted
through formal regulations of insiders. In turn, that arrangement generated a second order social
dilemma of provision of such formal institutions. This second-order dilemma was solved thanks to
the repeated interaction among insiders that supported informal cooperation. In other words, there
was no redundancy of institutions. The theory of repeated games did not helped directly with the
first-order social dilemma but it did indirectly with the problem of provision of formal regulations.
Self-governance was possible because there was a sustainable way to promote institution-building
efforts.
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APPENDIX
TECHNOLOGY OF A RENEWABLE RESOURCE
The purpose of this section is to describe the model of a renewable resource that is presented in
section 2 of the paper.
The production function is a relation between the quantity of input (level of effort in exploiting
the resource) and the quantity of output (amount of resource obtained in harvesting). The
derivation of the production function involves three steps. The first step is to model the growth
of a renewable resource, the second step is to introduce a harvesting technology, and the third is
to consider prices.
The biologic dynamic of a renewable resource over time can be described with the logistic
equation 
dx
dt
r x
x
K
= −





1  that is widely employed in the literature (Gordon, 1954; Clark, 1990;
Baland and Platteau, 1996). The evolution of the population x over time t is a quadratic function
of x itself. The parameter K is the maximum size of the population level (or resource stock) that is
usually called the carrying capacity. Loosely speaking, the parameter r measures the growth rate,
that is, the time needed to reach K. the dynamic of a resource according to a logistic equation.
Figure 3 shows an example of this function for forest growth.
<   Figure 3 about here   >
So far the model describes the dynamic of a biological resource not subjected to harvesting
activity. The next step is to model the harvest function. Assume that the marginal return of one
unit of effort Q is proportional to the population level x :  S n x= , where S stands for the
physical amount of the harvest. In other words, the higher the stock of the resource, the more
productive the harvesting activity will be. The production function is obtained by solving the
zero-growth condition 
dx
dt
S=  in the equilibrium population level x*: 
r
KQQKQxS 2* −==  . In
general, there is also the solution x**=0., when the resource is totally depleted and the harvest is
zero. The zero-growth condition implies that, in a given period of time, the natural growth of the
resource must be equal to the quantity of resource harvested. The stock level x* is the steady state
equilibrium and S = Qx* is the perpetual constant flow of harvest that the resource yields in
equilibrium.
From the graph, we can see that “at any population below a certain level K, a surplus production
exists that can be harvested in perpetuity without altering the stock level. If the surplus is not
harvested, on the other hand, corresponding increase occurs in the stock level, which ultimately
approaches the environmental carrying capacity K, where the surplus is reduced to zero.” (Clarke,
1990, p.1) The maximum surplus that can be obtained in perpetuity is called MSY (Maximum
Sustainable Yield) and is reached at x
K
=
2
.
The last step is the introduction of prices. Let c be the cost of one unit of effort and p the selling
price  v of one unit of harvest.  The sustainable level of revenues from the application of Q units
33
of effort to the resource is Y= vS  or  2bQaQY −= , where a = Kv and 
r
Kvb =  (see figure 2A).
There is an assumption that every unit of effort has the same return, namely 
Q
Y .
To sum up, the assumptions about technology are:
(1) Resource dynamic is logistic
(2) Harvesting efficiency is linear in the population level
(3) Marginal cost of one unit of effort is constant
(4) Earnings are divided in proportion of harvesting efforts
ANALOGY WITH OLIGOPOLY
The problem faced by appropriators of a renewable resource is formally equivalent to the
problem that firms face when they decide the amount of goods they want to sell in a market. The
unregulated common ownership solution (tragedy of the commons or NE in Figure 2) is the
Cournot equilibrium of an oligopoly when the competition in on quantity and entrance of new
firms is blocked. The reinterpretation of the parameters is straightforward: qi is the quantity sold
by firm i in a market with a linear demand function  Y = a - bQ  and a constant returns to scale
technology. The socially optimal case corresponds to a monopoly and the open access case is like
a market with perfect competition. While the formal analysis of the two problems is exactly the
same, the welfare evaluation of the different regimes  is opposite. In the case of a monopoly, the
solution is not socially optimal because the firm does not consider the consumer surplus, while in
the case of a renewable resource the rent - the new label for firm profits - is the only welfare
consequence to consider and so its maximization leads to the socially optimal solution. In the new
setting, a zero-profit outcome means complete rent dissipation.
PROTECTION FROM TRESPASSING
This section presents a model of property rights enforcement toward outsiders. The goal is to
show that under some reasonable conditions some trespassing occurs in equilibrium.
Detecting and convicting trespassers were costly activities. We could assume that the trial
involved a constant cost while the cost of monitoring the land was increasing with the degree of
its completeness. Under the assumptions that as the enforcement of property rights becomes
complete its cost goes to infinity, a partial enforcement was socially optimal and that might
explain why outsiders still attempted to trespass.
Consider the following three assumptions: (i) outsiders’ actions were detectable at a cost, (ii)
monitoring cost was increasing in the probability to detect the trespassing action and moreover
(iii) as the probability po to observe the action approaches one, monitoring costs mo go to infinity.
We can model this concept with the function  mo(po) = 
po
po
−1
   ,   where po∈[0,1).
The interaction between the potential trespassers and the community is modeled as a game where
the community has the powers to levy fines on trespassers when they are caught. A trespassing
action involved harversting a given amount of resources d that is subtracted to the community
profits. As explained, monitoring was costly, but no extra deadweight loss is in this model for the
activity of collecting the fine. A decision based on a cost-benefit analyses would have considered
the loss of resource caused by trespassing, the revenues from the fines,  as well as the monitoring
costs: max{po} {-d·M(po) + f·po·M(po) - mo(po)}
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Where M is the expected number of trespasser attempts, M = π*/(d + f·po) and π* is the actual
rent enjoyed by the insiders from the common resource. The number of trespassing attempts in
equilibrium M* is a proxy for the degree of enforcement of the property rights toward outsiders.
Under some quite reasonable conditions (f>d/2·π* and f+d>0) there exist only one acceptable
solution 0<po*1<1 while the other solution is too big, po*2 >1. The solutions are both equal to 1 in
the degenerate case when f+d=0, which is not possible since by assumption d >0 and f≥0.
The enforcement could be improved by increasing the expected sanction of trespassing f·po.which
could be done either by boosting monitoring activity or increasing the nominal sanction f.  I call
the enforcement complete when there is no expected attempt to trespass, M*<1. Given a level of
punishment f, the optimal monitoring policy in general involves some positive effort but not
detecting every single trespassing, 0<po*<1. The punishment ceiling f” is binding when the
amount f* defined by M(f*,po*(f*))=1 is such that f*>f”.
As Barzel puts it: “If it is assumed that for any asset each of these costs is rising and that both the
full protection and the full transfer of rights are prohibitively costly, then it follows that rights are
never complete, because people will never find it worthwhile to gain the entire potential of
“their” assets” (Barzel,1997, p.2).
MONITORING INSIDERS
The costs to monitor insiders mi could be thought as similar to the one for outsiders, mo. Consider
the following three assumptions about the cost of the joint activity of monitoring outsiders and
insiders, m,
(i) It exhibits economies of scale because the guards that are on the common land to patrol for
trespassers can detect violations by insiders at a low additional cost, m(po,pi) < mo(po) + mi(pi),  for
any po,pi>0;
(ii) The function m should reduce to the elementary functions mo and mi when one of the target
groups, either insiders or outsiders, is not monitored, m(po,0) = mo(po)  and  m(0,pi) = mi(pi);
(iii) The joint activity should be still more expensive than one single component carried out
independently, m(po,pi) > mo(po) and m(po,pi) > mi(pi), for any po,pi>0.
An example is the cost function m(po,pi) = mi(pi) +(1- s·pi) mo(po), where 0<s<1/2 satisfies
properties (i) through (iii), or more specifically the function is m(po,pi)= ( )
po
popis
pi
pi
−
⋅−+
− 1
1
1
.
Property (i) is obvious since (1-sıpi)<1. The two properties (ii) can be easily verified by
substituting pi=0 or po=0. The first of properties (iii) is verified when m(po,pi) - mo(po)>0, which
reduces to x>1-(1-s)/s·po, which is true when s<1/2. The second of properties (iii) is verified
when m(po,pi) - mi(pi)>0, which reduces to x<1/s, which is true when s<1.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
(SUB-SAMPLE: rural Charters from Valley of Non, 1581-1644)
Feature Number of
doc.
(tot.of 23)
% of
relevant doc.
Relevant documents
TRESPASSING AND IMMIGRATION
1 • Monetary sanction imposed on outsiders who
trespassed on the common land
23 100% All (= 23)
2 • Non-member residents had to pay an annual fee to
use the common land
10 43% All
3 • Explicit consent of village members (vicini) was
required to use the common land
5 22% All
OBSERVABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS
4 • Higher sanction for violations at night 12 52% All
 5 • Higher sanction for violations committed by outsiders 16 70% All
6 • Guards for vineyards 15 100% Where vineyards
were mentioned
7 • Prohibition against harvesting grapes before a publicly
announced day
13 87% Where vineyards
were mentioned
8 • Guards for high mountain meadows and forests 15 -
9 • Prohibition against mowing hay before a publicly
announced day
12 80% (10)
OTHERS
10 • Participation at meetings was compulsory for all
village members
19 83% All
11 •  A share of the monetary sanctions had to be given to
the Prince or to the Landlord
8 35% All
12 •  Only witnesses with a good reputation can be
accepted in the village court
9 39% All
Notes: The 23 Charters analyzed are all the documents published in Giacomoni (1991) concerning the Valley of Non (current administrative
district of the Val di Non) in the years 1560-1660 with the exclusion of 3 Charters that were in Latin (Sarnonico and
Ronzone, 1586; Mechel, 1587; Bresimo, 1603). Subsequent modifications to the original Charters up to the year 1800
have not been counted in the table. That would add 3 to line (2) , 2 to (3), and 1 to (8) and (9)
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Figure 1: ITALY DURING THE RENAISSANCE
Notes: the Principality of Trento was a mountain area on the Italian side of the Alps part of the Carolingian Empire. It was located North of
the Republic of Venice. The current Trentino region covers a surface of 1,465 square miles and in 1754 had a population of 206,000
scattered in more than 300 villages (Cole and Wolf, 1974; Provincia Autonoma di Trento, 1995). Source of the map: Adapted from Muir's
Historical Atlas: (1911),  http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/sbookmap.html (checked on Oct 2000)
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Figure 2: POSSIBLE RENT LEVELS FROM THE USE OF A COMMON RESOURCE
Notes: Total rent Π =π1 + π2   (example of rent with 2 users) .
SO = Social Optimum, NE = Nash Equilibrium, GP=Green-Porter, OA = Open Access.
The dots shows a symmetric outcome for each rent level.
Figure 3: EXAMPLE OF BIOLOGICAL DYNAMIC OF A RENEWABLE RESOURCE:
FOREST GROWTH
Note: the empirical data for red fir (upper line) comes from Trentino and for beech (lower line)
 from another region of Italy. The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for the fir is at 70 years. ISAFA (82)
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1 The oldest know of such Charters dates back to 1202 and was drawn by the villagers of Civezzano, a small village
nearby the administrative center of Trento.  Most of the documents here quoted are from Giacomoni(1991), which
copied 190 rural Charters of the Trentino area from the parchments that were found in the Biblioteca Comunale of
Trento,  Archivio di Stato of Trento, Archivio della Curia Arcivescovile of Trento, Biblioteca Civica of Rovereto,
Ferdinandeum Museum of Innsbruck, Castel Bragher and several village archives. Nequirito (1988) surveyed the
literature that published the text of Charters. Many Charters have not been published yet and new ones are discovered
every year. For documents relative to some other regions in the Alps, see Batl (1951), Cortesi (1983), and Pototshing
(1953).
2 The reference is to the villages of Romeno, Don, and Amblar. Regulation of the gate is mention in the 1459 rural
Charter (chapter 24: Item che la chiave della porta di Vallavena sia tenutta et conservatta nella sacrestia della chiesa di santa Maria di
Romeno).
3 Allen (1998) defines property rights as “one’s ability, without penalty, to exercise a choice over a good, a service, or
person” and transaction costs as “the costs of establishing and maintaining property rights”. See also Barzel (1997) and
the classical article of Demsetz (1967). Besides trespassing, legal disputes over community borderlines were very
common as it is testified by the incredible number of documents on the matter that can still be found in the archives.
4  Libretto di Amministrazione (1589): “per una codanaza fatta per aver menado entro legna da le giare del nos”, which literarily
means "for a penalty inflicted for having removed firewood from the bank of the river Nos".
For the rural Charters of Mezzolombardo see Devigili (1979).
5 On the best of my knowledge at least three-quarters of the Trentino villages have had a Charter by 1803 (284 villages
out of 377). The count is approximate for two reasons: First, I took as total the number of villages the land register units
in which the province of Trento was divided in 1897; secondly, I have counted only the Charters that I have collected
but some Charters might have been lost or not found by me. Both factors suggest that the actual ratio is above 75%.
6 The exact data are 48% and 31%. Source: 1897 land register data reported in Consiglio Provinciale d’Agricoltura, 1903.
7 The data are from the Catasti Teresiani of 1780-90, manuscripted books recording ownership rights (Archivio di Stato di
Trento). Goio(1978) reports the summary statistics for the village of Levico and Varesco (1981) for Predazzo. A more
systematic study of the extent of common ownership could be carried on. In 1897 more than 76% of the forest in the
region was municipal or State ownership. After 1803, both political and economic shocks reduced the extent of
communal ownership. Part of the village estates were divided in individual plots or sold after the end of the Principality
of Trento. An increasing population and more generally and increasing logging activity reduced the extension of the
village forests (Perini, 1852, Monteleone, 1964).
8E(QNE(N))=(4N/((N+1)2))
9 It is a similar logic to the supply side of a market where there is free entry. If for any reason the outsiders have a
discount rate lower than the insiders (for instance because of their temporary stay), the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is even
more serious.
10 The situation could however have been improved employing information-gathering institutions.
11 In the discussion, a publicly observed signal is assumed. Cooperation is more problematic with private signals. A
villager sampled the status of the common land in a given number of locations while doing his daily activities and did not
usually cover the whole land and count every tree in order to find out the exact quantity of the leftover timber or grass.
The signal was thus a random variable, which yielded different draws to different villagers because the sampled areas
were in general different. This individual heterogeneity in the signal could easily make implicit cooperation unravel. If
communication is allowed, however, the information will likely be aggregated into a public signal (Kandori and
Matsushima, 1998; Compte, 1998).
12  There is a perfect formal symmetry between firms competing on quantity in an oligopolistic market and users
exploiting a common resource. See appendix for a more extensive explanation.
13 Some Charters report at the opening the list of the heads of the families present at the meeting. Women usually moved
to the man’s village when they got married. The last name was transmitted through male lineage and only the pater
familia was entitled with the right to use the common land.
14 From Statuti et Ordini della Spet. Communità di Nago e Torbole (1683): Nago and Torbole, 1647: “Cittadini, che non
habitaranno non possino goder beni communi” (c.73: They cannot bring timber outside the village borders; they can use the
common land only if they still have individually owned land in the village). “Cittadini, che partono dal commune, et ritornano,
che non possino goder beni communi, se non passato un anno” (c.74). There is probably a relationship between the location of
these two communities nearby the Garda lake – the biggest in Italy - and the very detailed regulations contained in their
Charter for people who where leaving the community, temporary or definitely.
See also Tres, 1551 (the 1599 modifications regulates the vicino status) and Casez, 1632, c.45
15  See Dossi (1913) and Dossi (1927)
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16  Meadow assignments can be found in Pradibondo 1221, Condino 1340-3,  Storo 1347, Nago-Torbole 1533,
Caderzone 1591 (Papaleoni, 1891, Papaleoni, 1892, Valenti, 1911, Dossi, 1927). Forest assignments can be found in
Storo 1347, Nago-Torbole 1541. Many other rural Charters mentioned temporary assignments of meadows (sort)
(Mortaso, 1558, c.119-125), though sometimes the wording is ambiguous. Individual assignments were in fact family
assignments. The individual assignments of common land has been interpreted as an early form of individual ownership
(Papaleoni, 1892) but it remained in many ways closer to common than to individual ownership.
17 A qualified majority of at least 2/3 was required to sell the common land in Cles 1641, c.5 and in Cis 1587, c.80.
Some authors interpret the absolute prohibition to sell the common land as a pivotal aspect of the traditional land
management of the Trentino communities (Andreatta and Pace, 1981). In this paper we argue that this statement is not
empirically correct and that it is not a requirement from a theoretical point of view to ensure a long-term relationship
among users. Absolute inalienability and indivisibility of the commons were not cornerstones of the historical form of
common ownership in Trentino, although selling the commons was sometimes subjected to the authorization of the
feudal authorities (Cagnò 1587, c. 3, modification of 1693). An interesting discussion about the role of tradability of
property rights in the commons can be found in Seabright (1993).
18 Example of forestieri were the residents of neighboring villages, seasonal workers living in the village, occasional
travelers. Similar systems were adopted in other regions of Europe (Popkin, 1979).
19 We are more likely to observe explicit immigration regulations where the per capita endowment of common forest and
pasture was highest. Some rural Charters do not mention rules to accept newcomers and the reason might well have to
do with the fact that nobody ever wanted to move into those “poor” communities See lines 4 and 5 of table 1 for the
frequency of immigration regulations. I did not test this conjecture.
20 For an example of male inheritance of the right to use the commons see Tres 1551 (and modification of 1599, chapter
102 and 103). The vicini were men representing their families. In particular circumstances the family could be represented
by a woman (in particular, the widow, if her male children were still too young). For a more detailed discussion on the
recognition of the peculiar nature of these historical forms of collective properties in the Alps, see Grossi (1982) and
Capuzzo (1985).
21 A letter from the governor (Scario) to the Prince dated 16 November 1583: “Et perché da uno tempo in qua molti forestieri se
maridano in done de Fieme solamente per haver detta vicinanza, et questi tali forestieri continuamente hanno fato e fano assai desordeni et
dani in li boschi de essa Comunità …” (Delugan and Visani, 1988, p.54).
22 Cles 1641 (modification 1719, c.2, “attestati autentici della sua buona vita et costumi”). In addition from requiring the
prospective member to give good references about his reputation, Nago and Torbole required some form of real
warranty in case of mis-behavior. For instance, see Nago and Torbole 1647, modified in 1670, c. 72: outsiders cannot
stay in the village for more than 3 days unless they own a piece of land or a house (stabili) worth at least 200 fiorini . No
outlaw could be accepted (banditi or ricercati). For a description of the situation in the Fiemme Valley see Ciresa and
Salvotti (1978) and Delugan and Visani (1988).
23  Cis, 1587 (all but 3 dissenters), Cles,1641, Tres, 1551 (unanimity required in 1599)
24 See the modification to Cis, 1587, chaper 80: “… alienare beni comunali o ricevere alcuno forestiero per vicino se meno di 3 vicini
son contrari” .
25  For example Cles, 1641,c.57: “Che li forestieri habitanti nella communità di Cles siino colettati dalla regola per l’honesto in loro
arbitrio, considerando la loro qualità et animali che tengono sopra li comuni, et in più concorrino ad ogni cosa ordinaria et straordinaria come
li vicini,…”. See also Tres, 1551 and following modifications.
26 The oldest know of such Charters dates back to 1202 and was drawn by the small village of Civezzano, nearby the
administrative center of Trento.
27 For example, the 1677-78 administration booklet of the community of Coredo lists at least ten fines extolled from
outsiders, oftentimes for cutting trees in the village forest as is reported in the Libri de Conti della Honoranda Comunità di
Coredo: “ricevuto per condane fatte alli sottoscritti come forestieri” (1677-78). This despite the fact that trespassers had to refund
the market value of whatever they harvested and in addition pay a penalty. There are other reports of fines where it is
not specified if the payment came from insiders or outsiders: “per due larici taliati nel ingazato, e venduti a Sfruz” (1672-73),
“per haver tagliato un pez dent in sas nella sorte” (1673-74), “per il valor di legni menati dal monte con buoi forestieri senza licenza”
(1677-78).
28 Raising the level of the fine has two additional effects, a beneficial and a detrimental ones. The benefit comes from the
extra incentive in detecting trespasser (an increase in p). The extra cost is due to the increasing effort necessary to collect
the fine from the trespasser, since he could for instance appeal to the landlord and Prince courts.
29 For the text of the Moderatio Betta see for instance Salter e Malgolo, 1586. For a comment on the Moderatio Betta see
Welber (1992).
30 This rule was almost always there if there were vineyards in the village (see table 1). For an example see Tassullo, Rallo,
Pavillo and Sanzenone, 1586, c.30, 52, 60. One reason was to collect the decima (tax on the harvest) but fear of thefts
40
                                                                                                                                                            
were relevant as Sanzeno (villa), 1586, c.27 makes clear: in case somebody needs to harvest a day before”che ogn’uno sia
obligato lasciar da vendemar appresso li suoi confinanti: che non debba integralmente vendemare in un luogo, havendo confinanti, et questo si
apparerà alli regolani; et che quello il quale vendemerà sia obligato avisar li decimani che vengino pigliar la sua decima”.
31  For an example Vigolo Vattaro, 1496, c.22
32 For references from rural Charters, see for instance Malosco 1593, c.25, 26 and Tres 1551, c.53, 54, and 55.
 Monteleone (1964), pages 34-37, provides clear evidence for the years 1810s when the rural Charters were abolished. He
writes about the thefts in the vegetable gardens: “L’istituzione dell’orto nel Trentino era ritenuta particolarmente rischiosa per la
facilità e la frequenza dei furti che sconsigliavano l’agricoltore non solo dal dargli il desiderabile respiro superficiale ma anche dall’erigerlo in
aperta campagna e distante dagli abitati.” and again about fear of thefts on fruit trees: “Un altro ramo redditizio della produzione era
costituito dal frutteto, la cui diffusione, in generale notevole, trovava però una limitazione comprensibile in non poche regioni caratterizzate da
alti indici di delinquenza, che inibiva col timore dei furti l’iniziativa del contadino”. Another colourful example is the theft of the
wooden supports from the vineyards: “… il timore dei furti, a tal punto incruditi negli ultimi anni, da convincere il contadino di non
poche regioni che pali e tronconi ‘sarebbero rubati, se non il primo, certamente il secondo inverno seguente’”.
33  For two among many: Salter and Malgolo, 1586, c.26 (fines doubled at night); Sanzeno (villa), 1586, c.13 (fines
doubled for outsiders), c.6 (differential treatment of outsiders from insiders: need to leave timber in the village for three
days).
34 Pieve di Sanzeno, 1586, ch.23: “Item per tor via molti abusi et cative usanze et cativi costumi che per alcuni che per il passato si ha
fatto, si statuisce che niuno della pieve non debba, né anco forestiero ardisca, di stare di notte, né dì di festa, eccetto che il gazaro, uno over più,
in la montagna predetta ed massime nel tempo della segagion ed mentre è ancor il fieno nelli pradi: sotto penna de lire cinque per cadauna
persona; ed se fosse rubato fieno ad alcuno over legnami over anco taiato legnami (…) che si imputi tal furto ed contrafacion a quello over quelli
che si trovarono esser stati la note over il giorno di festa sul monte”, see Cagnò, 1587, c.43 for a more generic rule against working
during holidays.
35 There were also guards for the vineyards (saltari delle vigne). Vineyards were nearly all in individual hands but there still
was a need to enforce the property rights toward trespassers. This activity was organized collectively and regulated in the
rural Charters (see table 1). Switching from village to individual ownership would does not exempt from the need for
external enforcement of property rights.
36 The 1350 tax register for the Valley of Non, a district that represents less than one fifth of the area, mentions 38
villages of a size variable between 5 to 59 families (foci). Under the generous assumption of 5 people per family on
average, the biggest village had less than 300 inhabitants (Bezzi, 1964). There was no requirement to own land
individually in order to participate to the meetings. In order to modify a Charter usually a qualified majority of the people
needs to be present.
37 Oral communication by Marco Boscolo, June 2000.
38 The fact that we do not often observe formal regulations also in oligopolistic markets is because cartels are illegal
contracts. In order to overcome the unavailability of the otherwise convenient way of enforcing the agreement through
courts, the oligopolistic firms use Folk-theorem type strategies.
39 In addition to this economic reason there are probably sociological and anthropological aspects that deals with the risk
of social disruption due to unlimited revenge (Girard, 1972). The risk is higher when there is not a well-defined norm for
how much punishment should be considered enough.
40 Bringing weapons to the meetings, even a knife or a farming tool, was prohibited. Sometimes the guard (Saltaro) could
bring the roncola, a special cutting tool used for chopping wood.  Many charters explicitly punish the use of insulting
words during meetings.
41 Seio, 1616, c.1: The refusal to take on the governor office when elected is punished. Vicini are appointed guards by
rotation. See also Casez, 1632, c.5. The Charter of Romallo,1598, c.81 mentions the need in general of the vicini to
perform their duties, “fare tutte le foncioni ordinarie et straordinarie”.
42 Romallo, 1598, c.46 “… et se alcuno vicino dicessero e non volessero far per fuogo, sia astretto et sottoposto a perdere e renunciare la sua
parte di commun et sia obligato pagar l’affitto come forestiero”.
43 The service provided by the community organization were valuable. Since insiders contributed to building the social
capital they were asked to pay less than outsiders for such services. An example are the payments requested to outsiders
for the services of protection of property rights inVion, 1620, c.45, “Item hanno statuito et ordinato che se alcun forestiero che
haverà o possederà beni nelle pertinenze di Vion sia tenuto ong’anno dar al saltaro, qual haverà avuto custodire delli suoi beni, una quarta di
segalla.” See also Pieve di Vigo di Ton, 1644, c.2 (outsiders pay more than insiders for the services of the guard). Anohter
example is  about the service of damage estimation from village officers Sanzeno (villa), 1586 (modification 1694, c.5)
“Che li regolani per stimare danni habbino per loro mercede carentani sei a ciascheduno di loro, et il medemo al saltaro denuntiante; et se il
pretendente l’estimo del danno fosse forestiere, haverano li regolani et saltaro il dopio”
